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Feminist Legal Theory and the Reading of
O'Brien v. Cunard
Ann C. Shalleck"
In July 1889, Mary O'Brien, a young, Irish, immigrant woman traveling
to Boston in steerage on the "Catalonia," a ship of the Cunard Steamship
Company, was given, against her will, a smallpox vaccine by Dr. I.T.M.
Giffen, the ship's doctor. The vaccine left her body covered with sores and
blisters. Two years later, in O'Brien v. CunardSteamship Co.,' the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in an opinion written by Judge Knowlton held
that the trial court had ruled correctly that Mary O'Brien's claims for battery2
and negligence could not even go to the jury. The appellate court agreed with
the trial court that, as a matter of law, she had consented to the vaccination.3
Dismissing all evidence of her desire not to be vaccinated, disregarding her
statement to the doctor that she had been vaccinated already, and refusing to
evaluate from her perspective the threatening and coercive nature of the
circumstances under which she received the vaccine, the Supreme Judicial
Court concluded, as had the Superior Court in Boston, that there was "no
evidence" of lack of consent.4 The court also held, as a matter of law, that
a steamship line is not liable for the negligence of a doctor employed by the
company.The case appears to be an injustice from a feminist perspective. Male
judges at all levels of the judicial system countenance a male professional's
unnecessary invasion of a woman's body leaving her scarred and suffering.
Neither the male professional nor the company employing him are accountable
for harm to the woman. Furthermore, the judges effectively silence the
woman's voice within the legal system by ruling that her desires, her
* Professor of Law and Director, Women and the Law Project, American
University, Washington College of Law, A.B. Bryn Mawr College, J.D. Harvard Law
School.
With her knowledge of women's studies, history and health care, Emily K. Abel
helped me develop my ideas for this article. Andrew Popper, my colleague who
teaches torts, gave me support and encouragement. Robert Dinerstein, in his comments
on an earlier draft, provided insight about the dynamics of consent within professional
relationships. I thank them all.
1. 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891), reprinted at 57 Mo. L. REv. 347.
2. Id. at 266-67, 57 Mo. L. REV. 347-49. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court refers to the legal question as one of assault, rather than battery.

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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understanding, her statements and her experience are of no account at all. The
jury can not even consider them. The result is hardly a surprise.
Were feminist legal theory to stop here, the contribution would be
important. By attending to the gender of the participants in the legal system,
we can see a court's decision in a different way. We look not just at a rule
or a principle, but also at who is deciding and who is affected in which ways.
Gender becomes one means for understanding the result. It may be the
primary explanatory concept or it may be one of several, but it must be
acknowledged. 6
Feminist legal theory has, however, gone beyond looking to the gender
of the participants in the legal system to explain particular results. It has
sought to identify how gender affects our very ways of thinking about legal
issues. It has explored the ways that gender itself can be a distorting category
when not understood as embodying a multitude of different experiences
shaped by interaction with factors other than gender, such as race, ethnicity
and age. It has examined how the range of women's experiences get
constructed by (or eliminated from) the legal system, within a particular
doctrine or across doctrinal categories. It has also begun to develop
alternative ways for approaching the analysis of legal issues. In this Article,
I will draw upon several of the themes in current feminist theory to analyze
O'Brien v. Cunard.
I. RECOVERING WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES:
TELLING WOMEN'S STORIES

One of the major projects of feminist scholarship in many different fields
has been the recovery of the suppressed stories of women from the official or
accepted accounts of events or conditions in the world.7 One form that this
project of recovery can take within feminist legal scholarship is the discovery
of women's experiences that exist behind appellate court opinions. At least
some aspects of that experience can often be gleaned from the trial court

6. Katharine T. Bartlett, FeministLegalMethods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 837-49

(1990) (asking the woman question is identified as one form of feminist legal method).
7. E.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearingthe Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 103334 (1991); Teresa de Lauretis, Feminist Studies/CriticalStudies: Issues, Terms, and
Contexts, in FEMINIST STUDIES/CRITICAL STUDIES 10-11 (Teresa de Lauretis ed.,
1986); Jane Flax, Postmodernismand GenderRelations in FeministTheory, 12 SIGNS
621, 641 (1987); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-PracticeSpiral: The Ethics ofFeminism
and ClinicalEducation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1630-34 (1991); Mary E. Hawkesworth, Feminist Rhetoric: Discourses on the Male Monopoly of Thought, 16 POL.
THEORY 444 (1988).
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record of a case.8 Fortunately for law teachers and legal scholars, trial court

records are often relatively easy to locate and obtain. Even deeper inquiries
are required to explore how women's experiences can get submerged or
distorted through the trial process 9 and within the lawyer-client relation-

ship. 10 Materials that present accounts of women's experiences as they are
interpreted throughout the many stages of litigation or within the lawyer-client
relationship are more difficult to find."

8. It is important, however, to be constantly aware that the record from the trial
court may not reflect a woman's experience. The depiction of an event within a trial
court is shaped by many different factors, including most obviously the lawyer-client
relationship and the formal and informal constraints that attach to the telling of a story
through the litigation process. For a discussion of the ways that these and other
factors can affect the client's story, see, e.g., Anthony K. Alfieri, Reconstructive
Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107
(1991); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as
Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered
Counseling: Reappraisaland Refinement, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 501 (1990); Christopher
P. Gilkerson, Poor Stories: OfLaw, Lawyers, and the Disempowered, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 861 (1992); Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks
in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration,77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989); Lucie E. White,
Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing
of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990).
9. See, e.g., Kristin Bumiller, Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence
against Women in Legal Culture, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND
LEGAL THEORY 95 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991); White,
supra note 8, at 6-19.
10. Alfieri, supra note 8, at 2118-30; Dinerstein, supra note 8, at 506-56;
Gilkerson, supra note 8; Lopez, supra note 8 at 1612-17; White, supra note 8, at 2132.
11. A number of scholars have recently begun the project of actually observing
lawyers at work. See, e.g., Maureen Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and the
Client: Towards a Radical Conception, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS:
LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND OTHERS 41 (Robert Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983);
ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER (1988); KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATrORNEYS AT WORK (1985); Carl Hosticka,
We Don't Care About What Happened We Only Care About What Is Going To
Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 SOC. PROBS. 599 (1979); Gary
Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet: Observations of Interviewing and
Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Office, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 177
(1986); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciensness:
Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 Yale L.J. 1663 (1989); Austin Sarat &
William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 93 (1986). There remain, however, few records of the experiences of
clients. A number of legal scholars have begun to develop ways to tell those stories.
See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 8, at 2109-10, 2114-18; Gilkerson, supra note 8; Lopez,
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Using the pieces of the record that we have in the O'Brien case, we can
discover other versions of Mary O'Brien's story. By comparing the story that
appears in the record to the appellate court's opinion, we can see how the
Supreme Judicial Court has made the story she presented at trial invisible.
Through their interpretation of Mary O'Brien's experience, they discount her
perspective and silence her voice.
Underlying the court's interpretation of Mary O'Brien's actions is a
model of individual choice and control regarding the decision to be vaccinated. For the court, the Boston public health regulations governing the
examination of emigrants to ensure vaccination for smallpox provide the
framework for Mary O'Brien's decision. These regulations offer several
alternatives. The medical officer of a ship can examine emigrants and give
a certificate of smallpox vaccination. With this certificate, an emigrant can
land without further examination. Without a certificate, an emigrant must
either be detained in quarantine or be vaccinated by the port doctor. The
Cunard Company operates within this regulatory framework. The company
has its surgeons "vaccinate all emigrants who desire it, and who are not
protected by previous vaccination."1 2 It then provides the necessary certificates from the doctor.
In the court's description of the regulatory framework, an emigrant has
a number of choices in complying with the smallpox regulations. The
emigrant can demonstrate prior vaccination against the disease; be vaccinated
by the ship's doctor; be vaccinated by the port doctor; or remain in quarantine
for fourteen days. In addition, in the relationship with the ship's doctor, the
emigrant exercises choice. The doctor is available to provide vaccination for
those who "desire"' 3 it. Emigrants can decide whether or not to use the
doctor's services.
For the court, the events on the Catalonia occur within this framework.
Notices of the quarantine regulations and of the "willingness" 14 of the ship's
doctor to vaccinate those who need vaccination are posted around the boat.
Through these notices, the passengers learn of the choices available to them.
The law will "presume"15 that the passengers understand the regulatory
framework and therefore understand the "importance and purpose"16 of
vaccination for anyone without a vaccination mark. Within the court's vision,
the passengers have not only choices, but also the information necessary for
making those choices. They know their options and the consequences of

supra note 8; White, supra note 8, at 21-32 n.96.
12. O'Brien, 28 N.E. at 266, 57 Mo. L. REv. 347.
13. Id.

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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exercising them. Each passenger on the ship is an autonomous individual who
can make free, informed decisions about how to comply with governmental
regulation and how to get medical care.
The assumptions of the model as set out by the court are at odds with the
conditions on board the Catalonia, as documented in the record of the case.
Nevertheless, the court uses the assumptions of the model in explaining the
experience of Mary O'Brien. Relying on these assumptions, the court can
disregard or obliterate Mary O'Brien's own story.
First, facts that do not fit with the model are ignored. For example,
within the model of individualized choice and control, emigrants need to know
what their choices are. However, the cross-examination of Mary O'Brien
indicates quite clearly that she did not know anything about the vaccination
requirements until she was about to be vaccinated. Even when she got some
information from another woman who was waiting to be vaccinated, what she
learned was incorrect. The woman told her that if she had no vaccination
mark, she would have to be vaccinated on board the ship. Mary O'Brien had
not read the notices. She had not been told by the crew nor the other
passengers about the notices. She did not know that the notices were about
vaccination. She did not know that if she was not vaccinated on the ship, she
would be kept at quarantine. She did not know what quarantine was. She did
not know anything about the process at quarantine. She did not understand
what would happen if she did not have the certificate from the ship's doctor.
Judge Knowlton never acknowledges in his opinion that Mary O'Brien had no
idea what choices she faced. Instead he creates a presumption of her
knowledge based on the notices.
Second, the court uses the model to attribute motive. Without a
certificate from a ship's doctor, an emigrant faces detention at quarantine. In
order to avoid this detention, emigrants can seek out the ship's doctor to
secure the certificate. The doctor is provided for their benefit so they may
avoid the consequence of quarantine. According to the court, Mary O'Brien
got the vaccination in order to avoid detention. She wanted to obtain a card
that would "save her"'17 from detention and she wanted to be vaccinated "for
that purpose."'18 Relying upon this motive to explain her behavior, the court
thereby forecloses inquiry into her actual reasons for being vaccinated.
Third, where facts in the record do not fit with the model, the court
simply changes them. For example, in the model, it is critical that the
relationship between the doctor and an emigrant be a voluntary one in which
the emigrant exercises choice and control. The doctor is willing to provide
vaccinations. He vaccinates only those who desire it. 9 The model is

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. The court goes even further in spelling out the assumptions about the doctor-
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inconsistent with a doctor telling emigrants that they have to do anything. He
is not enforcing a regulatory requirement. He is only making it possible for
them to meet the requirement in one of a number of ways. Therefore,
although the record of Mary O'Brien's testimony at trial indicates that Dr.
Giffen told her that she "must" be vaccinated, the court twice uses the word
"should" in recounting Mary O'Brien's own testimony, which is described as
"undisputed." 20
The court has made Mary O'Brien's experience invisible within the
official account of what happened. In some respects her experience is
ignored, in other respects experiences she did not have are attributed to her,
and in still other respects her experience is directly contradicted. The result
is that her story is not told, although it was her experience that brought the
case to court. The model of abstract, autonomous individuals making free,
informed choices about compliance with governmental regulation and about
obtaining medical care has helped to hide and distort her experience.
Although this model has been critiqued from a number of different perspectives, 2' the feminist critique emphasizes the way the abstract individual does
not reflect the actual experiences of many individuals. The actual experiences
of individuals, whose identities are shaped by gender, as well as by other
factors that intersect powerfully with gender, such as race and ethnicity, are
without significance. 2
Discrepancies between the official account and Mary O'Brien's story are
particularly important because of the status of the official version. The
authoritative texts in the law, appellate opinions, do not just state rules and

patient relationship in the section of the opinion addressing the negligence claim. The
ship's doctor is "in readiness" for the passengers on board. They "may employ" the
doctor, "if they choose." The doctor's work is "under the control of the passengers
themselves." They "employ" the ship's doctor, just as they may employ another doctor
who happens to be on board. They can also choose to treat themselves or to go
without treatment. Once they employ the doctor, they choose the nature of their
treatment, and they have control over the decisions. "If they employ the surgeon, they
may determine how far they will submit themselves to his directions, and what of his
medicines they will take and what reject, and whether they will submit to a surgical
operation or take the risk of going without it." Id. at 267, 57 Mo. L. REV. 348.
20. Id. at 266, 57 Mo. L. REV. 347.
21. See, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM (1961); see also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL

STUDIES 86-113 (1987); Amy Gutmann, CommunitarianCriticsofLiberalism, 14 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 308 (1985).
22. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 6, at 837, 843, 849, 855-56; Katherine
O'Donovan, EngenderingJustice: Women's Perspective and the Rule ofLaw, 39 U.
TORONTO L.J. 127, 131 (1989); Heather Wishik, To Question Everything: The
Inquiries of FeministJurisprudence,1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 69 (1985).
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resolve legal issues. The judge's description of a situation also comprises "the
facts of the case," the definitive statement of what happened. When a law
professor asks a student to state the facts of a case, the professor almost
always means the appellate court's description of the event or situation at
issue. When the case is cited, distinguished or used in the construction of a
legal argument, these are the facts that matter. Judge Knowlton's description
of Mary O'Brien's vaccination by Dr. Giffen is a piece of the law. Other
facts, alternative descriptions of the same facts, are without legal significance.
Within feminist theory, discovering women's stories is important for at
least three reasons. First, we can see how the official versions of the facts are
partial.2 The appellate court is choosing, shaping, interpreting, and even
misrepresenting. The "facts of the case" can be seen as the product of the
historically and socially situated understanding of the judges. 24 The gendered
nature of the legal profession generally, and the judiciary specifically, is
significant in understanding the accounts contained in the appellate opinions 2. At the same time, there are other components to the "situatedness"
of the judges, including class, race, and ethnicity, that intersect with gender
to shape the understanding that the judges bring when telling the official
story of Mary O'Brien.26
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the tension between the official
version of the facts and the suppressed stories provides a starting point for
critique of the constructs that organize the judge's understanding of the
world.27 This critique is rooted in the actual, concrete problems that we find
with the official facts.'
The fact that Mary O'Brien, a young, Irish,
emigrant woman en route to Boston, does not know what her choices are, does
not have information about the consequences of those choices, and does not

23. Wishik, supra note 22, at 68.
24. Mary E.Hawkesworth, Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and
Claims of Truth, in FEMINIST THEORY IN PRACTICE AND PRocEss 327, 344-45
(Micheline R. Malson et al. eds., 1989); Teresa de Lauretis, Eccentric Subjects:
Feminist Theory and HistoricalConsciousness, 16 FEMINIST STUD. 115, 128 (1990).
25. Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 1643; Mary Jane Mossman, Feminism and Legal
Method: The Difference It Makes, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW 283,287 (Martha
A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991); Judith Resnick, On the Bias:
Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv.
1877, 1928-33 (1988).
26. de Lauretis, supra note 24, at 130-34.
27. Hawkesworth, supra note 24, at 349-51; Wishik, supra note 22, at 74.
28. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, ChallengingLaw, EstablishingDifferences:
The Futureof FeministLegal Scholarship,42 FLA. L. REv. 25, 28, 32 (1990); Vicki
Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: JudicialInterpretations of Sex
Segregationin the Workplace in Title VII CasesRaising the Lack oflnterestArgument,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1750 (1990).
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believe that she has any choice at all provides a beginning point from which
to critique a model of abstract, autonomous people making knowing and free
choices, as well as a practice of judging that proceeds from that model.29
Third, discovering the suppressed stories is a step in finding new ways
to construct the law so as to encompass these experiences. Understanding
women's experiences of powerlessness when confronted with the dual
requirements of state-imposed regulation and medical authority is a critical
step in creating the law applicable to this situation. This step does not tell us
what justice is in these situations and it does not identify the possible ways
to secure it. It does, however, ground the feminist search for ways to
overcome that powerlessness and to create a different
kind of law rooted in
30
the multiple experiences of many different women.
II. CRITIQUING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
LEGAL CONCEPT OF CONSENT

A second important project of feminist scholarship has been the critique
of purportedly neutral legal rules and principles to reveal the gendered nature
of the experiences and norms of behavior contained within them. 31 Feminist
scholars have demonstrated how legal doctrine that embodies male experience
and viewpoint has led to the exclusion and subordination of women.32 They
have documented women's resistance to these doctrines and to the gendered
visions contained within them. They have shown both the possibilities and

29. Hawkesworth, supra note 24, at 350-51; Mari J. Matsuda, LiberalJurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls'
Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REv. 613 (1986).

30. See, e.g., de Lauretis, supra note 7, at 10; Fineman, supra note 28, at 33;
White, supra note 8, at 52-58; Wishik, supra note 22, at 75-77.
31. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstructionof ContractDoctrine,
94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Nancy Ehrenreich, PluralistMyths and PowerlessMen: The
Ideology ofReasonablenessin Sexual HarassmentLaw, 99 YALE L. J. 1177, 1207-08,
1215-16 (1990); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1105-21 (1986); Fineman,
supra note 28, at 28; Lucinda Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's
Issues in a Tort's Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 57-66 (1989); Catharine
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward a Feminist
Jurisprudence,8 SIGNs 635, 658 (1983); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986
Term, Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 61 (1987); Fraces E.
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study ofIdeology and LegalReform, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1497 (1983); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trialfor Women: Sex
Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARe. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623, 631-32 (1980).
32. See supra note 31.
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limitations of integrating this resistance into legal strategy to reconstitute legal
doctrine.33
In order to reveal the gendered nature of the doctrines of the law,
feminist theory looks critically at gender differences within human activities
and understanding. It directs our attention to the relationship of gender to the
allocation of power and control. It also increasingly requires us to incorporate
differences among women into our understanding of gender.3 ' Although
there are disputes within feminism about the sources of gender differences, the
ways to think about them once identified, and what to do about them, feminist
scholars agree that the recognition of gender is critical. At the very least,
identifying the gendered nature of experiences and understanding both
provides a basis for critique of purportedly neutral concepts and contributes
to an understanding of human activity inclusive of women.
By analyzing the court's statement of the doctrine of consent in O'Brien
v. Cunard, we can see how gender affects the relationship of experience and
legal doctrine. The court says the legal issue is whether Dr. Giffen's action
was "against the will ' 36 of Mary O'Brien. Whether Mary O'Brien consented

33. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, SocietalFactorsAffectingthe CreationofLegal
Rules for Distribution of Property at Divorce, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW 265
(Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The

Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 589 (1986).
34. See, e.g., de Lauretis, supra note 7, at 10; Fineman, supra note 28, at 30-41;
Marilyn Frye, The Possibility ofFeminist Theory, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 174 (Deborah Rhode ed., 1990); Linda Gordon, What's New in
Women's History, in FEMINIST STUDIES/CRITICAL STUDIES 20, 25-26, 28 (Teresa de
Lauretis ed., 1986); Sandra Harding, The Instability of the Analytic Categories of
Feminist Theory, in FEMINIST THEORY IN PRACTICE AND PROCESS 15-20 (Micheline
R. Malson et al. eds., 1989).

35. See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference in
THEORETICAL PERSPECrIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah Rhode ed., 1990); see

also Jill K. Conway et al., Introduction: The Concept of Gender, in LEARNING ABOUT
WOMEN: GENDER, POLITICS, & POWER XXI (Jill K. Conway et al. eds., 1987); de
Lauretis, supra note 7, at 14-15; Flax, supra note 7, at 626-27; Gordon, supra note 34,

at 29-30; Martha Minow, Adjudicating Differences: Conflicts Among Feminist
Lawyers, in CONFLICTS INFEMINISM 149 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds.,
1990); Joan W. Scott, DeconstructingEquality-Versus--Difference: Or, the Uses of
PoststructuralistTheory for Feminism, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 134 (Marianne
Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990); Adelaide H. Villmoare, Women, Differences,

and Rights as Practices: An Interpretive Essay and a Proposal,25 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 385, 394-99 (1991); Lise Vogel, Debating Difference: Feminism, Pregnancy,
and the Workplace, 16 FEMINIST STUD. 9 (1990); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing
Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989).
36. O'Brien, 28 N.E. at 266, 57 Mo. L. REv. 347.
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to the vaccination is to be determined from her "overt behavior,"37 not from
her "unexpressed feelings. 38 The court looks to "the surrounding circum-40
stances 3 9 to decide if her behavior indicated consent. Finding "nothing,
in her conduct to show that she did not want the vaccination, the court holds,
as a matter of law, that she consented.
In the court's view, once Mary O'Brien's feelings are eliminated from
consideration, the meaning of her conduct is so clear that no jury could
reasonably find that the vaccination was against her will. At least two factors
contribute to the court's clarity about the interpretation of Mary O'Brien's
conduct and demonstrate the gendered nature of their understanding. First,
there is choice of perspective. In looking at Mary O'Brien's overt acts "in
connection with the surrounding circumstances,, 41 the court adopts the
perspective of Dr. Giffen. The reasonableness of his understanding of the
circumstances matters, not hers. The court is making an implicit choice to
value his perspective over hers. The world is seen through the eyes of a male
doctor and not an Irish, female emigrant who is traveling in steerage. That
choice appears to be natural. There is no perceived need for justification.
Why does this choice of perspective seem so natural to the court? At one
level, the choice hardly needs explanation. Given the similarities of situations
between the judges and the doctor, it is not surprising that they would see the
world through his eyes, rather than Mary O'Brien's, that they would not even
be aware that they were making a choice. Thus, the "situatedness" of the
judges helps explain their decision.4 2 Many of their assumptions about the
world make the perspective of the doctor appear general and not partial to
them. It is important to look beyond the characteristics of the particular
actors, however, to understand why the court constructs the doctrine of
consent from the perspective of Dr. Giffen, rather than Mary O'Brien.
Underlying the court's construction of the doctrine of consent is a gendered
understanding of the use of force.43
The issue of consent to a battery concerns whether the use of force is
justifiable. Justification is based on the decision of the person against whom
force is used. Force is justified when that person wishes to accept it. In
deciding if the force is accepted or rejected, the court looks to the experience
and understanding of the person using the force, not to the person doing the

37. Id.

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

42. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 881; Hawkesworth, supra note 24, at 330, 332-41,

343, 348; Minow, supra note 31, at 13.
43. See Hawkesworth, supra note 24, at 350.
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accepting or rejecting. How is the person using force to know how to act?
The experiences and concerns of that person are put at the center of the
court's view of consent. Therefore, Dr. Giffen's understanding of Mary
O'Brien's actions is at the core of the court's inquiry. The person against
whom force is used may have a range of experiences regarding the activity
involving force, including being a victim or a willing participant. Within the
court's decision, the concerns and understanding of this person are peripheral.
Whether or not there actually was a choice about accepting the force, whether
or not Mary O'Brien knew of the choice, and whether or not she could have
refused the force are not even subjects of inquiry.
When the court chooses the perspective of Dr. Giffen, it is both drawing
upon and reaffirming the centrality of the experience of using force. When
it denies the perspective of Mary O'Brien, it is both reflecting and reaffirming
the marginalization of the experience of receiving force. Although the
connection between gender and force may not be inherent, our culture has
placed the use of force primarily within the male sphere of experience. Being
an object of force is part of the female sphere of experience. Much of
women's experience of force, including their victimization, has remained
either largely invisible within the dominant culture or subject to societal
stereotyping."4 When the Supreme Judicial Court constructs the doctrine of
consent from the perspective of Dr. Giffen, their work goes on within the
framework of a gendered understanding of force. 45

44. See, e.g., Judith Allen, "The Wild Ones:"
Criminology, in DISSENTING OPINIONS:

the Disavowal of Men in

FEMINIST EXPLORATIONS OF LAW AND

SOCIETY 21 (Regina Graycar ed., 1990); M. Bograd, Feminist Perspectives on Wife
Abuse: An Introduction, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 11, 14 (K. Yllo
& M. Bograd eds., 1988); Bumiller, supra note 9, at 95; NANCY HARTSOCK, MONEY,
SEX, AND POWER: TOWARD A FEMINIST HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

164-66 (1983);

SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF

THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 11-52 (1982); Estrich, supra note 31, at 110521; Flax, supra note 7, at 641; Schneider, supra note 31, at 624-30.
45. In identifying conceptions of force as gendered, I do not mean to overlook the
significance of other factors that intersect with gender in the construction of our
understanding of force. Both men and women of different racial and ethnic groups and
of different classes are portrayed differently within our conceptions about the use of
force. They also have very different experiences regarding the use of force. In saying
that the concepts contained within the doctrine of consent are gendered, I mean both
to identify gender as one of the critical elements in shaping the concepts and also to
reaffirm the multiplicity of experiences within each gender. See Angela P. Harris,
Race andEssentialism inFeministLegalTheory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Lynne
N. Henderson, Review Essay: What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 193, 199 (1987-88); Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1983).
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The second way we can see the impact of gender in shaping the
relationship of experience and legal doctrine is in the court's choice of "the
surrounding circumstances." 46 Many of the circumstances important to an
understanding of whether or not Mary O'Brien expressed consent to the
vaccination are invisible in the court's analysis. These aspects of the event
are critical, however, in the account presented by Mary O'Brien's lawyers.
In their theory of the case presented on appeal, Mary O'Brien was forced to
submit to the vaccination against her will. The lawyers argued that submission does not equal consent. 47 The circumstances, including the doctor's
overt acts, that made the situation coercive and threatening and that showed
the exercise of force are essential in understanding her conduct as submission
and not consent. The exceptions filed by her lawyers at the conclusion of the
trial, as well as their brief on appeal, stress these parts of the record.48
The steerage steward told the 200 women steerage passengers who were
on deck that they had to go below into steerage, without telling them the
reason. From the steerage area, there was only one door, which was at the top
of a staircase. At the middle of the staircase was a landing where the doctor
and two steerage stewards positioned themselves. There was no other way to
leave steerage. The 200 women were lined up and told that they would not
be allowed to leave until they had been examined. One of the steerage
stewards stood at the door leading to the deck and let no one leave without
the doctor's order.
The court mentions none of the circumstances surrounding the vaccination, except for the fact'that "about 200 women passengers were assembled
below." 49 The court ignores anything that could have led Mary O'Brien

reasonably to believe that she had to be vaccinated, that there was no choice.
Dr. Giffen knew of these circumstances as did Mary O'Brien. Could he think
that in these circumstances he was presenting the passengers, his patients, with
a choice? For the court, however, the threatening and coercive aspects of the
situation are without significance. Although the doctor was certainly aware

46. O'Brien, 28 N.E. at 266, 57 Mo. L. REV. 348.

47. Plaintiff's Brief at 1, reprinted at 57 Mo. L. REv. 482.
At the outset, a distinction must be drawn between mere submission and
positive consent. ...
It is no answer to a claim for an assault that the plaintiff submitted to
it, if the circumstances are such that resistance would have seemed useless;
consent obtained by a show of superior force, or under such circumstances
that the will cannot be said to have acted freely, is not consent in contemplation of law.
Id.

48. Plaintiff's Exceptions, O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co. (Super. Ct. Suffolk
1891), reprinted at 57 Mo. L. REV. 470-78.
49. O'Brien, 28 N.E. at 266, 57 Mo. L. REV. 348.
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of them, he did not have to take them into account in interpreting the meaning
of Mary O'Brien's overt acts.
Against this background, the procedure for vaccinating the women has
a different significance. The women were lined up, and one by one, passed
by the doctor. They were not asked if they wished to be examined. They
were not told the purpose of the examination. Dr. Giffen examined each
woman's arm to see if there was a vaccination mark. Those with a mark were
allowed to pass. Those without were vaccinated. As they left, the doctor
instructed the steward to give each a card. Once the threatening and coercive
nature of the situation is acknowledged, the doctor's actions can be understood
as part of the exercise of superior force to compel acquiescence. No one had
to touch Mary O'Brien to let her know that she had no choice.
If the coercion and threat are acknowledged, and if the doctor's actions
can be seen as exercising force, then Mary O'Brien's behavior takes on a
different meaning. She did not get in line, but stood to the side. When she
was the only one left, except the two stewards, she went up to the doctor -and
told him that she had been vaccinated before. He did not inquire about the
previous vaccination. How did she know she had received one? What did
she know about it? On what part of her body was it administered? He did
not examine her to see if there was a mark anyplace else on her body. He did
not explain her choices if she had no mark. He did not discuss how a prior
vaccination that left no mark would be treated by the public health authorities
in Boston. He simply told her she had to be vaccinated. It was reasonable
for her to voice no further objection. It was not reasonable for the doctor to
conclude that she had given freely her consent.
What makes the court unwilling to acknowledge the circumstances that
indicate threat and coercion? Women's experiences of vulnerability and
danger have been an important part of their subordination. The law has been
slow to acknowledge the circumstances that create threats to women. 0 It has
often failed to give legal protection to women who face grave danger."' It
has required women to resist actively invasions of their bodies in order to

50. See e.g., Finley, supra note 31, at 55-56; Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment:
Women's Experiences vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 51-52
(1990); Schneider, supra note 31, at 624-30; Robin West, The Difference in Women's
Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987).
51. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images ofBattered Women: The Impact of
Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1041, 1082, 1085
(1991); Charlotte Germane et al., Mandatory Custody Mediation and Joint Custody
Orders in California: The Dangerfor Victims of Domestic Violence, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 175, 176-77 (1985); Schneider, supra note 31, at 626.
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claim violation.5 2 It has ignored power differentials in evaluating passivity
or lack of action by women. 3 It has overlooked the pressures on women not
to speak about dangers they face.54 It has assumed that women have choices
to escape threatening or dangerous situations, when there are no real
choices.55 It is only recently, with the rise of concerted feminist activity, that
these biases in the law have been identified and some change has occurred. 6
In addition to the two ways that the court's interpretation of the conduct
of Mary O'Brien and Dr. Giffen is gendered, so also is their identification of
the dispute in the case. The case stands for the proposition that "feelings" do
not matter in determining consent; only the "manifestations" of those feelings
in "overt acts" count legally. This question was not, however, put to the
court. The lawyers for both parties took for granted that only acts mattered.
The dispute, as presented in the briefs, concerned the inferences that could be
drawn from those actions. The lawyers for Mary O'Brien did not claim that
the question of consent should be decided based upon her unexpressed
feelings. They argued that the manifestations of her feelings showed that she
had not consented, or more precisely, that it would be reasonable for a jury
to find, based on those manifestations, coercion rather than consent. 7 The
lawyers for the Cunard Company disputed the meaning and significance of the
acts.58 They had no reason to respond to an argument about unexpressed
feelings.
Why does the court reframe the issue in this way? Feminist theory alerts
us to the importance of examining and critiquing the dichotomies we find,
particularly to see the ways that the dichotomies are associated with gender.5 9
The dichotomy between feeling and action certainly has gendered associations.
Feeling is female; acting is male. Within the context of the legal doctrine of

52. Cahn, supra note 51, at 1084; Estrich, supra note 31, at 1122; Henderson,
supra note 45, at 200-01; Weiner, Shifting the CommunicationBurden: A Meaniigful
Consent Standardin Rape, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 144-46, 150 (1983).
53. E.g., Estrich, supra note 31, at 1175; Henderson, supra note 45, at 205;
Germane et al., supra note 51, at 176.
54. E.g., Henderson, supra note 45, at 199.

55. Cahn, supra note 51, at 1084-85, 1087; Schneider, supra note 31, at 626-27.
56. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 33, at 606-10, 642-48.
57. Plaintiffs Brief at 3, 57 Mo. L. REv. 484.
58. See Defendant's Brief at 2-3, O'Brien.
59. See, e.g., de Lauretis, supra note 24, at 116-18; Regenia Gagnier, Feminist
Postmodernism: The End of Feminism or the Ends of Theory?, in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE

21, 24-25 (Deborah Rhode ed., 1990);

O'Donovan, supra note 22, at 143-44; Scott, supra note 35, at 136-38; Carol Smart,
Law's Truth!Women'sExperience, in DISSENTING OPINIONS: FEMINIST EXPLORATIONS

IN LAW AND SOCIETY 1, 8-9 (Regina Graycar ed., 1990)

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/5

14

1992]

Shalleck: Shalleck: Feminist Legal Theory
FIVE APPROACHES TO LEGAL REASONING

battery, acting is certainly the superior half of the dichotomy.' The court
associates Mary O'Brien's claim with the female. By creating this association,
by making it seem that her claim is at least partially grounded in an appeal to
feeling, even if it is not, then the legitimacy of the claim is undercut.61
III. RECOVERING WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES:
FINDING WOMEN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
To a large extent, feminist legal theory has not sufficiently addressed
women's experiences as litigants within the legal system. 62 The focus of
inquiry has remained primarily on the law that is created through the legal
system and the relationship of women's experiences in the world to that law.
The gendered nature of the legal frameworks and legal rules that are
constructed within the legal system is, however, related to the process of
actually going through the legal system. The emerging feminist scholarship
about women's experiences within legal institutions has begun to identify the
gendered quality of these experiences.63

60. For examples of discussions of how the dichotomies are not balanced, but
systematically weighted in favor of the male, and of how the exploration and critique
(deconstruction) of these sorts of dichotomies has provided a tool of feminist analysis,
see de Lauretis, supra note 7, at 15; Flax, supra note 7, at 628-29, 633-36; Scott,
supra note 35, at 138-46.
61. Feminist legal theory has also challenged the devaluing of feeling in the law.
Several theorists have suggested that feeling should be a more prominent and valued
part of the law. See Bartlett, supra note 6, at 857; Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 1639,
1669; Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of the
Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
289 (1989); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Women's Lawyering Process,1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); West, supra note
50; see also Susan M. Okin, Reason and Feeling, in FEMINISM AND POLITICAL
THEORY 15, 34 (C. Sunstein ed., 1990); Susan M. Okin, Thinking Like a Woman, in
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 145, 152-53 (Deborah Rhode

ed., 1990).
62. Some notable exceptions are Naomi R. Cahn, Defining FeministLitigation,
14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, (1991); Goldfarb, supra note 7; White, supra note 8. For
closely related work see also, Alfieri, supra note 8; Gilkerson, supra note 8; Lopez,
supra note 8; Gerald Lopez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REV.
1, 1-10 (1989); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making
Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1987-88); Lucie
E. White, To Learn and To Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and
Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699.
63. One of the major developments in legal literature that has made gender visible
within the legal system has been the reports on gender bias and the courts. Although
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Mary O'Brien went through the legal process, just as she went through
the trip on the Catalonia. The very existence of this litigation may represent
some resistance on Mary O'Brien's part to her experience of harm, coercion
and powerlessness on the ship. Unfortunately, we do not have materials that
could help us decipher what this litigation meant for her. The materials we
do have, however, raise important questions about the relationship of the
litigation process to gendered experience and to gendered doctrines.
First, why was the case brought? If it was filed primarily to obtain
compensation for Mary O'Brien's bodily injuries, the record appears
amazingly vague about the nature, extent and permanence of those injuries.
We know that about a month after the vaccination she was "suffering from an
eruption almost over her whole body, with blisters" and had a "very bad
ulceration on her arm where the vaccination took place." 64 It appears that she
was hospitalized for these problems. Was there some other reason for
initiating the litigation? Was Mary O'Brien angry about how she had been
treated? Was her father, who was with her on the ship and was not consulted
about the vaccination, angry? Was there some other concern?
Second, whose decision was it to litigate? The case was brought on
Mary O'Brien's behalf by her next friend because she was a minor.
Presumably, that friend was her father. Was it his decision to litigate? Or
hers? What part did she play in the decisionmaking? Was anyone else
involved? What did Mary O'Brien want to achieve? How did she view the
legal system?
Third, why were the lawyers interested in this case? Who were E. N.
Hill and Frederic Cunningham? How was the case financed? What sort of
relationship did Mary O'Brien have with them? How did they respond to her
accounts of her experience? Was she involved in decisions about the
litigation? Did she help develop the case theory?
Fourth, what was the trial like for Mary O'Brien? What was it like to
testify? How did she feel about telling her story? What did she think when
the trial judge directed a verdict? Was she angry? disappointed?
Although we have no answers to these questions, it is important for
feminist theory to make these questions visible. The process of engaging in
the legal system is itself deeply gendered. 65 However, the legal system has

these reports are not theoretical works, as that term is commonly understood, and
although there are many people on the task forces who are not feminists, the reports
have made important contributions to the development of feminist theory. See, e.g.,
Report of the FloridaSupreme Court GenderBiasStudy Commission, 42 FLA. L. REV.

803 (1990) (Ricki L. Tannen, reporter); Maryland Special Joint Committee, Gender
Bias in the Courts, (1989) (Karen Czapanskiy, reporter).
64. Plaintiffs Exceptions at 6, 57 Mo. L. REV. 474.
65. See supra note 62.
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also provided one way that women have protested against harm that has been
done to them. They have sought to redress that harm. They have sought to
tell their stories. They have sought to change legal rules that have contributed
to their subordination. They have found both success and failure and
contradictory combinations of the two in these endeavors. They have also
been unwilling participants in a system that has exacerbated their harm and
suffering. We do not know what the experience was for Mary O'Brien.
Doctrine emerges only at the end of a process. But any feminist evaluation
of the doctrines that emerged from Mary O'Brien's case remains incomplete
without at least the acknowledgment of the critical piece that is missing.6
IV. CONTEXTUALIZING THE DOCTRINE

A fourth theme of feminist legal theory has been the desire to contextualize legal reasoning and legal rules. Contextualizing can mean many things.
The term is used loosely to describe ways of thinking about the law as
existing not in isolation, but in connection with something else that is essential
to its meaning. These ways of thinking all challenge in some respect the
abstract character of both legal rules and the process of applying those rules
in particular situations. Contextualizing is not, however, necessarily a feminist
project. For contextualizing to operate as a feminist project, each of its
aspects must be approached critically, that is, with a consciousness of the
gendered nature of the concepts and ways of thinking being invoked.
Feminist legal theorists have identified a number of different aspects to
the project of feminist contextualization. First, contextualizing involves
focusing on the particularity and uniqueness of each situation by attending to
the richness and complexity of detail found within it. Second, it relies upon
the recognition of multiple perspectives for understanding any particular
situation, both at the level of individual participants, as well as the communities those participants belong to. Third, contextualizing involves identifying
the differing norms, practices and values that the multiple communities have.
Fourth, it acknowledges that the interests of individual participants and their
communities might be different. Fifth, disparities in power among the
participants and among their communities are acknowledged. Sixth, it
recognizes that individuals exist not in isolation, but in multiple relationships.
Those relationships are important in understanding not only a particular event,
but also the structure of the law. Seventh, it considers the ways that
individuals exist within and in opposition to institutions. Eighth, it draws

66. See Cahn, supra note 62, at 15-20; Ann Shalleck, Clinical Supervision in
Context: From a Case to a Vision, 72-73, 124-28, 144-51, 154-55, 158-67 (1991)

(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Missouri Law Review); White, supra note
8, at 21-58.
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upon knowledge from other disciplines to help interpret the meaning of
particular actions. Psychology, sociology, economics, literature, history may
all be used. Feminist legal theorists use these disparate approaches in various
combinations to highlight how context affects the understanding and analysis
of the law.67

These different aspects of contextualization could all be used in analyzing
O'Brien v. Cunard. First, I will develop one example of how content provides
insight into both what happened to Mary O'Brien and the legal construction
of that experience. I will place the case within the context of the historical
development of the doctor-patient relationship. In particular, I will identify
some of the gendered aspects of this relationship during the latter part of the
nineteenth century. Without doing a full analysis of the multiple ways that
gender was critical in the emerging character of the doctor-patient relationship
during this period, I will suggest how some aspects of this relationship help
us to understand the case. Second, I will note briefly other ways that analysis
of the relationships of the participants can offer a critical perspective on the
law in this case.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided O'Brien v. Cunard
in 1891, a time when professionalization was rapidly occurring within many
different parts of American society. The modern medical profession, in the
form we know it, had not yet taken shape. The full emergence of the modern
form of medical education, medical training, and medical practice was not to
occur until more than two decades later. This case happened at a time of
rapid change and intense social conflict within and around the emerging
profession. 9 Many of these struggles centered on questions of autonomy
and control for members of the profession.70 During this same period, the
modern form of the public health profession also emerged. At some points
this development intersected with, and at others was in conflict with, the
professional forms of the private practitioners. 71 Historians have documented

67. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 6, at 849-51, 855-57, 861; Goldfarb, supra note

7, at 1636-41; Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1597 (1990).
68. See MAGALI
ANALYSIS 37 (1977);
MEDICINE

69.
(1983);
70.

S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM:

A SOCIOLOGICAL

PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN

116-23 (1982).

GEORGE ROSEN, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN MEDICAL PRACTICE
STARR, supra note 68, at 79-127.

13-37

A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY
supra note 68, at 38.

ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE:

OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 12, 137

(1970);

71. ROSEN, supra note 69, at 25-36;

LARSON,
STARR,

supra note 68, at 135-138.
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many aspects of the gendered character of these developments during the late
nineteenth century. n
As part of physicians' quest for professional status and authority during
the latter part of the nineteenth century, they asserted greater control within

the doctor-patient relationship. 73 As the century drew to a 'close, the
authority and legitimacy of the profession became increasingly entwined with
rapid developments in scientific knowledge and technical competence.74 The
assertion of control and the attainment of technical expertise combined to give
character to the emerging profession. A professional culture of technical
expertise and distanced relations between doctor and patient was being
constructed quickly and intensively.

Gender was one component in that

construction.
The medical profession was overwhelmingly male. During the second
half of the nineteenth century, however, women had fought with some success
to gain entrance.75 The historical literature shows us the tensions that arose

72. See, e.g., BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD

(1979); PENINA M. GLAZER & MIRIAM SLATER, UNEQUAL COLLEAGUES: THE
ENTRANCE OF WOMEN INTO THE PROFESSIONS, 1890-1940 (1987); REGINA MARKELL
MORANTZ-SANCHEZ, WOMEN PHYSICIANS INAMERICAN MEDICINE: SYMPATHY &
SCIENCE (hereinafter Sympathy & Science) (1985); MARY R. WALSH, DOCTORS
WANTED: No WOMEN NEED APPLY (1977); Joan Jacobs Brumberg & Nancy Tomes,
Women in the Professions: A ResearchAgenda for American Historians,30 REV. IN
AM. HIST. 275 (1982); Regina Markell Morantz & Sue Zschoche, Professionalism,
Feminism, and Gender Roles: A Comparative Study of Nineteenth-Century Medical
Therapeutics, 67 J. AM. HIST. 568 (1980); Regina Morantz-Sandrez, Physicians, in
WOMEN, HEALTH & MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL HANDBOOK 469 (Rima

D. Apple ed., 1990); Carol Smith-Rosenberg & Charles Rosenberg, The Female
Animal: Medicaland BiologicalViews of Women and HerRole inNineteenth-Century
America, 60 J. AM. HIST. 332 (1973); Ann Douglas Wood, "The Fashionable
Diseases": Women's Complaintsand Their Treatment in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica,
4 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 25 (1973); see also STARR, supra note 68, at 117 &
123-26, for a general account of American medicine identifying developments
regarding gender.
73. STARR, supra note 68, at 81.
74. Morantz-Sanchez, Physicians,supra note 72, at 487; STARR, supra note 68,
at 134-40.
75. During the second half of the nineteenth century there were concerted efforts
to found medical colleges for women. Seventeen were started during this period.
Also, there was intense struggle to secure admission for women at elite, all-male
institutions. In 1890, after an organized campaign by a group of women, Johns
Hopkins finally agreed to admit women in return for a half-million dollars in
endowment from the women. In 1893-94, nineteen coeducational medical schools had
10% or more women. The number of women in the profession also increased. From
1880 to 1900, the national percentage went from 2.8 to 5.6. In several large cities, the
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when female doctors entered the medical world as the emerging professional
culture was being created.76 Gender influenced both how doctors viewed the
doctor-patient relationship and, in certain respects, the ways they behaved
within it.77 In particular, men and women doctors differed in certain ways
in their relationships with their women patients. 78
By the end of the century, a variety of factors converged to begin to
undermine the modest gains women had so recently made within the medical
profession. 79 Reaction against their presence was widespread." As the

percentage was higher. In Boston, 18.2% of the doctors were women. STARR, supra
note 68, at 117; Walsh, supra note 72, at 147-177; see also MORANTZ-SANCHEZ,
SYMPATHY & SCIENCE, supra note 72, at 64-89.
76. See. e.g., GLAZER & SLATER, supra note 72, at 1-23, 69-117; MORANTZSANCHEZ, SYMPATHY & SCIENCE, supra note 72, at 90-183; Morantz-Sanchez,
Physicians, supra note 72, at 481; Walsh, supra note 56, at 106-40.
77. The relationship between doctor and patient was shaped by many intersecting
factors including gender, class, race and ethnicity. The relationship between white,
male doctors and white, female, middle class patients has been analyzed by scholars.
See, e.g., Wood, supra note 72. Within the doctor-patient relationship, these women
were supposed to be extremely dependent and trusting. Women were subjected to
extremely harmful and debilitating treatments, often focusing on their reproductive
organs, even when their complaints had nothing to do with their reproductive systems.
Medical texts presented scientific explanations for women's inferiority, explanations
usually rooted in their reproductive organs. Treatment for "nervous disorders" was
either painful or isolating. Social control of unacceptable feelings or attitudes on the
part of the women was a part of the medical relationship. See also EHRENREICH &
ENGLISH, supra note 72; Smith-Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 72.
This historical work presents only one aspect of the gendered nature of the
control over women within the physician-patient relationship. It does not, however,
present a complete picture. It is important to examine the ways that other women were
treated in order to be able to identify similarities and differences. See infra note 83
and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Morantz & Zschoche, supra note 72, at 569.
79. The situation was quickly deteriorating. The number of medical schools that
trained women rapidly decreased as a result of increased state licensing requirements
permitting practice only by graduates of approved school, as well as the development
of national standard setting leading to accreditation. By 1909, only thrpe of the
seventeen women's medical schools were still in existence. The situation was
particularly severe for black women. Only two of the seven medical schools for blacks
remained. Driven by the rapid decline in the number of available places in medical
schools generally, deliberate discriminatory practices based on gender, race and
ethnicity were instituted throughout medical education. For example, in order to
exclude women from medical education, many schools established quotas of 5% for
women. Primarily privileged, white women could gain admission to these schools.
GLAZER & SLATER, supra note 72, at 76; STARR, supra note 68, at 124; see also
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profession became more elite and homogeneous, women were excluded from
meaningful participation in the creation of the professional culture.8 1 The
relationship between doctor and patient was constructed increasingly around
the experience of elite male doctors. The ascendancy of a culture based on
technical expertise and distanced relationships was a part of the process by
which men consolidated their domination of the medical profession. This
construction of the doctor-patient relationship helped to marginalize those
women 'who had become doctors and to foster the domination by men of the
medical profession. The interaction between Dr. Giffen and Mary O'Brien
described in O'Brien v. Cunard typifies a relationship that was becoming a
prototype of institutionally sanctioned; male-dominated medical practice in the
period. The case reveals the role of the law in the consolidation of these
practices.
Through a study of hospital records of the late nineteenth century,
historians have identified ways that medical care was provided differently by
men and women physicians.' In the treatment of poor women, male doctors

Gloria Melnick Moldow, Women Doctors in GildedAge Washington: Race, Gender
and Professionalism (1987).
80. GLAZER & SLATER, supra note 72, at 16; STARR, supra note 68, at 117, 124;
WALSH, supra note 72, at 178-206; Moldow, supra note 79, at 48-74.
81. Around the turn of the century, the medical profession was becoming
progressively more homogeneous. As competition among medical sects was replaced
by one dominant form of medical practice, as state licensing, permitting practice only
by graduates of approved schools, and national standard setting for medical schools
were instituted, and as medical education became longer and more expensive due to
the increasing curricular focus upon basic science and research, many medical schools,
particularly those not affiliated with universities, were forced to close. Educational
opportunities for less privileged groups became extremely rare. The institutions that
admitted people from the working and lower-middle classes, blacks, immigrants and
women in significant numbers were eliminated. See supra note 79. In addition,
internships at teaching hospitals, appointments to the staffs of those hospitals, and
membership in medical societies became necessary for professional success. These
positions were controlled by a small elite and were hard to secure. Race and gender
operated singly and in combination to create enormous barriers to involvement in the
profession. Black women physicians faced seemingly overwhelming obstacles.
STARR, supra note 68, at 102-06, 116-25, 162-63; Moldow, supra note 79, at 94-113.
82. See MORANTZ-SANCHEZ, SYMPATHY AND SCIENCE, supra note 72, at 203-31;
Morantz & Zschoche, supra note 72. Regina Morantz-Sanchez and Sue Zschoche
conducted a major empirical study of the behavior of'male and female doctors in late
nineteenth century Boston. They compared the records from two hospitals, one staffed
entirely by women physicians, the other by men. The New England Hospital was
founded by a women physician, Marie Zakrzewska, in 1862. Providing medical,
surgical, and obstetrical care for women and children, it was a
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of the period had virtually no interaction with their patients. They tended to
treat poor women as a uniform group, neither gathering any medical or social
information from them that would distinguish one from another nor individualizing treatment decisions except in a purely technocratic way.83 Women
doctors of the period practicing in the same communities and treating similarly
situated patients used the same sorts of therapies and prescribed the same sorts
of drugs as their male counterparts. However, the women doctors had much
more complex and extensive contacts with their patients and made decisions
concerning the course of treatment in a far more multifaceted way. They
solicited and elicited much more information, concerning both the medical
histories and the social situations of their patients. They also took many of
these factors into consideration in determining the duration and nature of the
patients' involvement with the medical care system.84

showplace for quality medical care in the latter third of the nineteenth
century. Ambitious women doctors longed to receive clinical training there,
and its teaching program was rigorous and demanding. Standards reflected
the very highest of the day.
MORANTZ-SANCHEZ, SYMPATHY AND SCIENCE, supra note 72, at 225. The comparable
hospital staffed by male physicians was Boston Lying-In, a teaching facility of the
Harvard Medical School.
It is particularly fortuitous for an analysis of O'Brien that these historical studies
were of Boston hospitals of the late nineteenth century.
83. MORANTZ-SANCHEZ, SYMPATHY AND SCIENCE, supra note 72, at 227, 229;
Morantz & Zschoche, supra note 72, at 577-78, 579-80, 584. The authors have
documented this phenomenon in two ways. First, male doctors, as distinct from
female doctors, in their record keeping provided little information differentiating one
woman from another, in terms of treatment, medical history and background or social
information. Second, male doctors, again distinct from female doctors, tended to
provide standard treatment with little variation based on individual need.
When treating middle-class women, these same male doctors behaved somewhat
differently. When attending home deliveries of middle-class patients, Boston Lying-In
doctors maintained complete and detailed records. Id. at 577. Male doctors did not,
however, differentiate among women in their scientific and medical understanding. In
their medical theories, all women were both "prisoners and products of their
reproductive systems." MORANTZ-SANCHEZ, SYMPATHY AND SCIENCE, supra note 72,
at 206. Although male physicians' attitudes about female inferiority affected both
middle-class and poor women, and the passivity and dependence of both groups of
women was maintained within the doctor-patient relationship, middle-class women
were treated in a more individualized fashion. See supra note 77.
84. MORANTZ-SANCHEZ, SYMPATHY AND SCIENCE, supra note 72, at 227-29,231;
Morantz & Zschoche, supra note 72, at 577-78, 579-80, 584.
Women physicians also differed in significant respects from men physicians in
their underlying scientific and medical theories about women's health. Women doctors
did not see women as inherently weak, sickly or emotional, nor primarily determined
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The picture of Dr. Giffen's behavior toward Mary O'Brien that emerges
from the record and the opinion in O'Brien v. Cunard is consistent with the
model of male-dominated medicine as practiced on poor women that is
described in the historical literature. First, there is uniform treatment. In the
process of vaccination, Mary O'Brien is not distinguished from any other
woman. She is one of an undifferentiated group. The group is brought to the
same place, at the same time, to get the same treatment. They are lined up
and processed through the treatment in exactly the same way. Mary O'Brien
attempts to distinguish herself from the group by holding back and by
standing to the side. She is asserting a claim to be treated in an individualized
fashion within a system of uniform treatment. Dr. Giffen, however, does not
vary the procedure or the treatment in any fashion.
Second, there is no attempt to gather or evaluate information in making
a treatment decision about whether to vaccinate. Dr. Giffen looks only at the
patient's arm to determine prior vaccination. He does not ask if there is a
mark on some other part of the body, and he does not search for a mark when
he finds out that there might have been a prior vaccination. Even when Mary
O'Brien asserts that she was vaccinated before, he makes no inquiry about the
circumstances of the prior vaccination to determine if it occurred and if it
might have been effective. It appears that the information has no bearing on
his decision to vaccinate. He does not see her particular history as important
to the uniform treatment he is providing.
Furthermore, Dr. Giffen seeks no information about her general social
situation that might be relevant to a decision about vaccination. He does not
ask about her family, although consulting with her father might affect her
feelings about being vaccinated. He does not find out her age, a factor
seemingly of importance to notions of consent. He does not inquire about
what awaits her in Boston.
Third, there is virtually no communication between doctor and patient.
Not only does Dr. Giffen fail to get any information about Mary O'Brien's
claim that she was vaccinated before, he discusses nothing with her. He does
not describe the reasons for being vaccinated, either medical or regulatory.
He does not explain that a prior vaccination may have been ineffective. He
does not present choices to Mary O'Brien, including the risks of not being
vaccinated.85

by their reproductive systems. Rather, for them, women were capable of good health
and had a right to it. Also, although many women doctors supported women's
reproductive role, they did not see women as physiologically determined by it.
MORANTZ-SANCHEZ, SYMPATHY AND SCIENCE, supra note 72, at 216-20; MorantzSanchez, Physicians,supra note 72, at 485.
85. Although we do not have many details in the record, it appears that the male
steerage passengers were treated similarly to the females. Although we do not know
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Although the interaction between Dr. Giffen and Mary O'Brien does not
occur within a hospital setting, it is striking that the characteristics of male
medical practice documented in the hospital setting are replicated in the public
health setting by a doctor engaging in the therapeutic application of immunology. These two settings were both of particular importance during the late
nineteenth century because they were at the forefront of change in medical
practice and professional culture occurring at the time.
Hospital-based
practice at a prestigious hospital was taking on increasing importance within
the structure of the medical profession. Internships at one of these institutions
assured professional status and essential clinical experience.86 Scientific
advances, including antiseptic surgery, were increasing the prestige of surgical
practice. 7 Physicians were gaining authority and control over the operation
of the hospitals, as well as over the nature of the patients' experience.' At
the same time, public health was one of the major successes of scientific
medicine at this period, increasing the prestige of the medical profession
generally.8 9 During this period, there was no rigid distinction between
medicine and public health. 90 Advances in bacteriology led to dramatic
decrease in disease through control of the water, food and milk supplies and

what any individual interactions looked like between the male passengers and the
doctor, the structural setting of the interactions appears to be the same. These
similarities highlight the ways that other factors interacted with gender in the
construction of the doctor-patient relationship. It is noteworthy that at this same
historical period, medicine and science created biological explanations for the
inferiority of blacks, immigrants and the poor that served as instruments of social
control, just as they did for women. MORANTZ-SANCHEZ, SYMPATHY & SCIENCE,
supra note 72, at 208, Charles Rosenberg, The Bitter Fruit: Heredity, Disease, and
Social Thought, 8 PERSP. IN AM. HIST. 189 (1974). In nineteenth century Boston, the
Irish were subject to discrimination within the medical community. For example, they
were initially excluded from admission as patients to Massachusetts General Hospital.
STARR, supra note 68, at 173. It is not uncommon for all members of disempowered
groups to be treated similarly to women. See, e.g., White, supra note 8, at 9-19.
86. STARR, supra note 68, at 163; Morantz & Zschoche, supra note 72, at 576;
Rosenberg, And Heal the Sick: The Hospital and the Patient in the 19th Century
America, 10 J. Soc. HIsT. 428, 437 (1977).
87. STARR, supra note 68, at 136.
88. Rosenberg, supra note 86, at 440-41.
89. STARR, supra note 68, at 136.
90. Id. at 138. The relationship between the assertion of state power to control
individuals through public health measures and the assertion of professional power and
authority within the doctor-patient relationship is complicated. See generally DEBORAH
A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 90-119 (1984). Although the court in the O'Brien
case places the decision within the rubric of the doctor-patient relationship, the court
is well aware -of the public health framework.
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the development of antitoxins.91 Related advances in immunology created
new vaccines which heightened the visibility and importance of preventive93
medicine. 92 Scientific expertise was at the heart of the enterprise.
Individuals were treated as the sites of contagion. 94
Dr. Giffen's actions fit within the emerging professional culture of
technical expertise and distanced relations between doctor and patient. He
was engaging in a form of medical practice being shaped by elite men in male
medical institutions. O'Brien v. Cunard reflects these historical developments.
It also plays a role in shaping them. The decision of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court ratifies the practice of Dr. Giffen. 95 Faced with a
challenge to these practices, the court permits a doctor to provide uniform
treatment. He can virtually ignore a particular patient's medical and social
history. He can refuse to engage in any communication with the patient.
Through the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court, these practices gain
legitimacy. The male-dominated professional culture creates the parameters
for addressing the issue of consent. The culture itself is strengthened. The
effect that this culture has on the ability of a patient to give meaningful
consent is removed from consideration.
The decision does more, however, than legitimize a prevailing form of
medical practice. The court implicitly, if unknowingly, chooses among
available models of professional medical culture. It is clear from the historical
literature that there was a competing model of how technical expertise could
be exercised within the doctor-patient relationship.96 Women doctors
operating within female-dominated institutions were constructing a different
type of professional culture. Although they subscribed to similar professional
standards regarding appropriate treatment, they provided that treatment in a
different way. They differentiated among patients. They sought out and paid
attention to information regarding medical and social history. They had
conversations with their patients. Had this model been evoked in O'Brien v.
Cunard, Dr. Giffen's actions could have been evaluated very differently. His
failure to pursue Mary O'Brien's information about prior vaccination, his

STARR, supra note 68, at 135.
92. Id. at 135-36, 138.

91.

93. BARBARA G. ROSENCRANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE STATE: CHANGING
VIEWS IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1842-1936 98, 127 (1972).

94. Id. at 98.
95. The O'Briencase was filed, tried and heard on appeal in the same community

in which the New England Hospital and the Boston Lying-In Hospital operated. The
case occurred during the same period as the practices described in the historical
studies. Thus, the decision itself was a part of the construction of the doctor-patient
relationship that was occurring in Boston in the late nineteenth century.
96. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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failure to present her options to her, his insistence on delivering uniform
treatment all take on a different significance. Within this alternative model,
he has failed to do just those things that would have enabled him to
understand if Mary O'Brien consented to the treatment.
By placing the case within the context of the historical development of
the doctor-patient relationship, we see various aspects of the court's decision
that would have been invisible without this inquiry. The process of contextualization is, however, multilayered, and it is important to maintain an
awareness of the incompleteness of any attempt at contextualizing. For
example, although we have seen the case within the context of the doctorpatient relationship in America, this context helps us to understand only
partially Mary O'Brien's experience within that relationship. We also need
to know about the doctor-patient relationship in Ireland in order to gain insight
into her understanding of and expectations about what was happening with Dr.
Giffen. How was medical care provided in Ireland at that time? Was it likely
that Mary O'Brien had ever seen a doctor? Where was medical care
provided? Who were the doctors? How did they view women? What sort
of communication would have occurred? Would a young woman have been
alone with a doctor? How were relationships within the family related to the
experience of medical care?
Exploring the case within the context of one relationship can also help
us see how inquiries about other relationships could reveal different aspects
of the case.97 For example, although the court views Mary O'Brien as an
isolated, autonomous individual, she appears in the record within the context
of her family relationships. She is a seventeen year old, Irish woman whose
mother has recently died. She is traveling away from home for the first time
in her life with her father and her brother. During the voyage, she is never
away from her father and brother. How is this family structure and experience
related to her encounter with the doctor? What does it mean that she is
removed physically from the context of her family to be vaccinated? What
does it mean that her decisionmaking is removed from the context of her
family? Who has made medical decisions for her in the past? Who has made
other decisions? What about patriarchal relations in the family? Why has the
court chosen to take her out of the context of the family in analyzing the
question of consent? What alternatives are available to the court? Why are
family relations not more central to questions of medical consent?

97. From a number of different theoretical perspectives, feminist theory has
focused upon the importance of the relationships within which women lead their lives
to an understanding of gender. See, e.g., de Lauretis, supra note 7, at 14; Flax, supra
note 7, at 628, 638; Martha Minow, FeministReason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J.
LEGAL ED. 47, 56 (1988); Villmoare, supra note 35, at 404-05; West, supra note 50.
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V. CONCLUSION: CONSEQUENCES FOR TEACHING
Is it justifiable to approach O'Brien v. Cunard as merely a statement of
doctrine, as part of the intricacies of the principles and rules that make up the
law of consent? Just as feminist legal theory challenges the ways we think
about legal issues, it forces us to question what and how we teach. Feminist
theory does not just add something interesting to the "basic" task of doctrinal
analysis. It helps us to redefine just what is basic. It shows us that to do
doctrinal analysis without a consciousness of gender is to suppress the
experience of women, to present male norms as neutral and to disguise the
ways that gender is integral to our understanding of what the law is, how it
came to be that way, and how it could be different. Feminist theory does not
add ideology to the curriculum. It reveals the ideology that is already there.
When we teach our students feminist methods of analysis, we give them
fundamental critical skills for understanding the law. In addition, we provide
them with material for shaping new visions and new possibilities of whit the
law can be.
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